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)
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)
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)
)
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>
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SCM LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, ,
vs.

]

WATKINS & FABER, and
WALTER P. FABER, JR.,

Case No. 19172

]

Defendant-Appellant.

PREFATORY STATEMENT
SCMfs statement that the "Facts have been mischaracterized" by Appellant is simply untrue.

The facts

cited in Appellant's brief are accurate and uncontested and
conclusively establish the basis for the two crucial questions
in this case —

(1) Was Fischer's 1979 promise to Watkins &

Faber for adjacent office space consideration for the signing
of the written 19 79 lease?, and, if so, (2) Does Watkins &
Faber have any remedy for SCM's refusal to keep the promise?
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT PREVENT
RESCISSION FOR REFUSAL OF THE PROMISE.
SCM's brief emphasizes the Statute of Frauds and
argues that there was not an enforceable oral contract for
the adjacent space, and therefore, Watkins & Faber has no
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remedy whatever.

Even assuming for purposes of argument

that the oral promise for the adjacent space could not
be specifically enforced because it was not in writing,
there is no doubt that the promise was made and that it was
specifically made to induce Watkins & Faber to sign the
written lease of July 9, 1979.

If, as SCM argues, Fischer's

promise was meaningless, then in fairness the 1979 lease
which would not have existed but for the promise should also
be just as meaningless.

Contrary to SCMfs position that the

promise had no value, it is undisputed that it had sufficient
value to cause the 1979 lease to be signed.
Because the promise induced Watkins & Faber to
sign the 1979 lease, it should not be isolated as an independent

<

transaction which might be unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds. Where valuable consideration was specifically
given to obtain the promise, that consideration should be
returned or cancelled if the promise is deemed not enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds.

If SCM cannot be

forced to enter into a lease agreement for the adjacent space,
then Watkins & Faber should not be forced to continue performance under the 1979 renewal lease.

The Restatement of

Contracts, Second, endorses legal principles applicable to
this case.

Section 141 states as follows:

§141.

Action for Value of Performance Under
Unenforceable Contract.
-2-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

(1) In an action for the value of
performance under a contract, except as stated
in Subsection (2), the Statute of Frauds does
not invalidate any defense which would be available if the contract were enforceable against
both parties,
(2) Where a party to a contract which is
unenforceable against him refuses either to
perform the contract or to sign a sufficient
memorandum, the other party is justified in suspending any performance for which he has not
already received the agreed return, and such a
suspension is not a defense in an action for
the value of performance rendered before the
suspension•
[Emphasis added.]
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate the
defense of failure of consideration.

Because SCM failed

to provide the promised adjacent office space, Watkins &
Faber was justified in suspending any further performance
under the lease.
Another provision of the Restatement of Contracts,
Second, Section 139, directs itself to specific enforcement
of oral promises.

Even though Watkins & Faber is not seeking

specific performance, the section emphasizes the principle
that the Statute of Frauds will not be applied where injustice
will occur.

Section 139 states as follows:

§139.

Enforcement by Virtue of Action in
Reliance.

(1) A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and
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which does induce the action or forbearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to
be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the
following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of
other remedies, particularly cancellation
and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation
to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or
forbearance corroborates evidence of the
making and terms of the promise, or the making
and terms are otherwise established by clear
and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or
forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or
forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
One factor in determining whether injustice can b
avoided only by enforcement of the promise is the availability or adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation.
In this situation, the promise for additional
adjacent space was the only reason Watkins & Faber renewed
their lease in 1979.

Watkins & Faber honored the lease and

paid rent until SCM refused to honor the promise.
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Watkins

Faber moved from the building because the failure of the
promise justified suspension of performance under the
lease and cancellation of said lease*

It would be unjust

to hold Watkins & Faber to a lease which would never have
been signed but for the promise which SCM refused to honor.
POINT II. SCM IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON
THE RECORDING ACT.
SCM argued to the lower court that it was a bona
fide purchaser under the recording act and has advanced
that argument in its brief.

The lower court ruled that

the recording act was not applicable because Watkins & Faber
was not attempting to enforce the oral promise for adjacent
space.

Even assuming for purposes of argument that the

recording act applies to the oral promise given as consideration for signing the 1979 renewal lease, in truth SCM
was not a bona fide purchaser because it knowingly assumed
the risk of claims and liabilities arising as a result of
SCMrs later actions which conflicted with prior unwritten
tenant obligations.

SCM's own purchase documents with

Fischer show that SCM considered the possibility of unwritten obligations to tenants.

For the purpose of showing

that SCM considered the risk and knowingly incurred some
liability to tenants under the purchase agreement with Fischer,

-5-
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Appellant moved to introduce the Exchange Agreement between
SCM and Fischer. (R-197).

The lower court refused to admit

the Exchange Agreement, Exhibit 4D, paragraph 6 of which
states as follows:
Indemnification. Company hereby agrees to
indemnify and hold Fischer harmless from and
against all claims and liabilities arising out
of the ownership, operation and management of the
Fischer Property from and after the Fischer
Property Transfer Date.
On the other side, the lower court admitted the Assignment
of the Tenant Leases, Exhibit IP, paragraph 2 of which
states as follows:
. ... It is expressly agreed that Assignee
shall have no authority or duty to negotiate,
compromise or settle any unwritten obligations of
Assignor.
By the above wording, SCM acknowledged the possibility of
unwritten obligations to tenants.

The lower court erred

by not admitting the Exchange Agreement because after SCM
purchased the building, SCM entered into a long-term lease
with IML thereby preventing fulfillment of the 1979 promise
of adjacent space, an unwritten obligation to Appellant.
The Assignment of Tenant Leases provides that SCM had no
authority or duty to negotiate, compromise or settle the
lessor's unwritten obligations, but it clearly does not
relieve SCM from liability for SCM ! s own actions thereafter
which interferred with one such unwritten tenant obligation.
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By virtue of the Exchange Agreement, SCM specifically
assumed all liability for SCM's actions which might have
compromised unwritten obligations whose performance had not
taken place.

It is obvious from the wording of the two

documents that SCM considered that its actjsjion} could
conflict with unwritten obligations Fischer owed to Newhouse
tenants.

Nevertheless, SCM consciously chose not to

inquire of the Newhouse tenants, including Appellant, before
it purchased the Newhouse Building and gave IML a long-term
lease on the sixth floor..
SCM's long-term lease of the sixth floor to IML
conflicted with the unwritten promise of additional space
to Appellant.

Since SCM expressly assumed responsibility

for its actions and was not a bona fide purchaser, it
should not be allowed to deny the promise and prevent
termination of the 19 79 lease.
CONCLUSION
The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate
Appellant's defense of failure of consideration.
Even if the recording act were applicable to this
situation, SCM is not a bona fide purchaser.

The promise of

adjacent office space was consideration for signing the 1979
renewal lease.

It would be unjust to hold Watkins & Faber
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to a lease which would never have been signed but for the
promise of adjacent space and deny any relief whatever for
failure of the promise.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of October,
1983.
WATKINS & FABER

By

^i^UiL^ «<J ^u£Z&~^~^
Brian W. Burnett
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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